This article describes the law relating to condominiums ('condominium law') 
I. Introduction
This article aims to give a comprehensive overview of condominium law in Taiwan. Introduced below is the historical development, doctrinal basis, key concepts and scope of the law. Also covered are limitations on the sale and lease of apartments (before or after construction of buildings is finished); the formula for calculating co-ownership shares; quorum rules and the procedure for owners' meetings; and apartment owners' and inhabitants' financial and social obligations. The role of bylaws, the dispute-resolution mechanism and the management of daily matters are also discussed. More ink will be spilt on the two major controversies: first, the source and ownership of the common fund; and second, whether the condominium board and the condominium association have or should have juridical personality. This article concludes after a short overview of the recent developments in condominium law in Taiwan.
This article draws on legal sources from all three branches of the government.
The Condominium Administration Act of Taiwan (公寓大廈管理條例; 'the CAA') and the Taiwan Civil Code (民法; 'the TCC'), enacted by the legislature, are the major sources of law restated below. Various land use and building regulations, stipulated by administrative agencies (mainly the Ministry of the Interior 內政部), and dozens of court decisions (ranging from those rendered by the court of the first instance to those by the Supreme Court) are also cited. The official language in Taiwan is Chinese. All statutes and regulations are thus enacted in Chinese. The Ministry of Justice (法務部) put English translations of certain important statutes and regulations on its website. 2 In this article, the author re-writes the 'official' English translations of the statutes for the sake of clarity.
II. Background and the Basic

A. Historical development
The condominium form has been recognised by law as early as 1930, when the TCC went into effect. The TCC of 1930, however, contained only two articles regarding condominium form (TCC, sections 799-800), which were insufficient to delineate the rights and duties of residents in apartment buildings. 3 In 1987, the central competent authority (中央主管機關), the Ministry of the Interior, drafted a bill on condominium form (高樓集合住宅管理維護法), but the bill did not become a statute. In 1992, the
Ministry of the Interior announced the administrative rule 'Rule on Maintaining
Safety in Condominium and Common-interest Community' (公寓大廈及社區安全管 理辦法), as criminals were found hiding in apartment buildings. 4 In 1989, the Ministry of the Interior commissioned two famous scholars and a justice of the Constitutional Court to draft a new bill on condominium form. 5 After an amendment by the legal task force at the Ministry of the Interior, the bill was sent to the Legislative Yuan, which passed the CAA after a couple of revisions in 1995. To date, 2 In the case of the CAA, see its English translation at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=D0070118. 3 It was contended that the original TCC, s 799 could only apply to real estate developments in which units are vertically separated (such as townhouses), but not those that are horizontally separated (such as apartment buildings). The Supreme Court of Taiwan has ruled in a case (80 年台上字第 804 號判決) that s 799 applies to horizontally separated units. The legal uncertainty, among others, is the driving force behind a fuller-scale condominium law. Gang-Ming Wu, New Property Law (Sanmin, Taipei, 2009), p 274. 4 See Shu-Huey Li, 'Condo Administrative Act: Goals and Legislative Process ' (2004) 33 Kaohsiung University of Applied Science and Technology 245 at 246. 5 German law may influence the bill. The Honourable Dong-Xung Dai, then dean of the National Taiwan University College of Law and the scholar in charge of drafting the bill, revealed that he used his sabbatical to study German condominium law for a year before starting to draft the law. See Dong-Xung Dai et al, Condominium Law in a Nutshell (2 nd ed, Perennial Group, Taipei, 2014), pp 21-22. the CAA is still the major source of condominium stipulations and the CAA is often described as 'the constitution for residential housing' (住宅憲法).
Another wave of improvement in condominium law came in 2009, when the TCC was amended. Section 799 of the TCC was expanded, but the new stipulations are only a summary of the most important definitions already existent in the CAA.
The brand new section 799-2 of the TCC allows the sole owner of a building to convert it to condominium form. Section 799-1 does some heavy-lifting.
Section 799-1(3) gives minority apartment owners who disagree with the amendment of their condominium bylaws (規約) a cause of action to petition the court to revoke any 'obviously unfair' (顯失公平) 6 amendment within three months after the decision is made (this is discussed more in Part IV(E) below). According to section 799-1(4), condominium bylaws bind grantees (繼受人) of unit ownership, whether they know the contents or not. Also, other covenants (其他約定) among unit owners bind successors (概括繼受人) even without their actual knowledge of the covenants, whereas purchasers or the like (特定繼受人) of unit ownership are bound only if they know or should have known (明知或可得而知) these covenants (discussed more in Part IV(B) below).
B. Dogmatic basis of the condominium regime
Condominium form of shared ownership in Taiwan implicitly recognises the 'threefold relationship' (Dreigliedrige Einheit in German 7 ). The threefold relationship consists of private ownership of an apartment; co-ownership of the common areas (共有部分); 8 and membership in the condominium association. 9 The lawmaker explicitly defines 'unit ownership' as containing only the former two elements of the threefold relationship (CAA, section 3(1)). 10 Nonetheless, membership in the condominium 6 The TCC, s 799-1(3) lists several factors that courts should take into account when deciding whether the condominium bylaws are obviously unfair: the location, area, purpose of use and use condition of the individual unit, common area and base land; whether the owner has paid the consideration; and other conditions. 7 See Tze-Chien Wang, Property Law of Civil Code (2 nd ed, Author, Taipei, 2010), pp 214-15. 8 To be more exact, the common areas are held in tenancy-in-common, but co-tenants cannot request partition of the common area: TCC, s 823. association is a built-in feature of unit ownership (CAA, section 25). The legislature does not conceptualise membership as part of the property rights of unit owners, but functionally, Taiwan has the equivalent of the threefold relationship.
Between the so-called 'dualistic system' and 'unitary system', the Taiwan regime better fits the description of the former, under which the private ownership of an apartment and the co-ownership of the common property are of equal importance, and together form a 'composite ownership'.
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Both the lawmakers of the CAA and the English translation of the CAA make conceptual errors about the key terms in condominium law. Section 3(1) of the CAA defines '公寓大廈' as 'a building and its base that has indicated definite boundaries structurally … and may be divided into a number of units' (emphasis added). Two problems arise: one is that '公寓大廈' is translated as 'condominium' while its transliterated and more accurate meaning is 'low-rise' (公寓) and 'high-rise' (大廈).
The other is that the definition of low-rise and high-rise includes their base land. As buildings and land are separate type of real estate in Taiwan, the definition of lowand high-rise buildings probably should not include land.
The CAA also fails in consistency. In section 23(1) of the CAA, low-rise, high-rise and base land are listed as separate things, suggesting that lawmakers there consider them separate type of real estate again. Then, section 3(1) of the CAA defines '區分所有' as 'a number of people [who] divide one building and each owns an individual unit of the building and also holds a share of the common areas', and '區分 所 有 ' is translated as 'unit ownership', while the better translation is simply 'condominium'. In short, the key concepts in their original and translated languages are anything but clear.
Here are the key concepts as defined and used in this article. Condominium is a type of concurrent ownership.
12 Several types of buildings, such as high-rise(s) and low-rise(s), are held in condominium form. In other words, high-rises and low-rises are the things, whereas condominium is a type of property form. A high-or low-rise (also referred to as an 'apartment building' below) contains multiple apartments (the physical space of a separate unit) solely owned by a unit owner. Within such a building but outside of the apartments are the common areas, held by all unit owners in tenancy-in-common. The base land of an apartment building is also held by all unit owners in tenancy-in-common-when the CAA refers to the common area, sometimes base land is also included. The sole ownership of apartments, the co-ownership of the common area in the building, and the co-ownership of the base land are bundled together and cannot be granted or mortgaged separately.
Given the official status of the CAA English translation, this article makes compromises. 'Apartment' and 'individual unit' (專有部分; also 'unit' for short) are used interchangeably. Condominium and unit ownership should be coterminous, but due to the confusion described above, this article will refrain from using the term 'condominium' from this point on to the extent feasible. When readers encounter the term 'condominium' in the quoted English translation of the CAA, bear in mind that it means high-and low-rises.
C. Various types of condominiums
Neither the TCC nor the CAA limit the application of condominium forms to residential usage, although section 1 of the CAA does hint that the CAA was enacted with its full attention on residential uses. 13 In Taiwan, mixed uses in one building, particularly mixtures of residential and commercial/office uses, are quite common.
Corporate owners of apartments for commercial uses and owners of apartments for residential uses are treated the same under the relevant law. Perhaps as a result of the prevalent mixed uses, there are no official statistics of the numbers of residential and commercial units.
The condominium form, as stipulated in the CAA, is applicable only to buildings, as evidenced by section 3(1) of the CAA, cited above. As no other statutes recognise the condominium form, mooring spaces for boats and yachts (dockominiums), airspace and caravan sites cannot be held in this form. 13 CAA, s 1(1): 'The Act is enacted to enhance the administration of condominiums to improve the living quality' (emphasis added).
D. Physical division of the buildings and land
A building held in condominium form and its base land can be further divided into components. The building contains multiple apartments and common facilities such as elevators. Apartments 14 constitute the individual unit, 15 whereas common facilities constitute the common area, which is, along with base land, co-owned by all unit owners pro rata. Designated common areas (約定共用部分) are 'individual units in the condominium that are designated for common use by agreement', whereas designated private areas (約定專用部分) are common areas of a high-or low-rise that are designated by agreement to be used by specific unit owners (CAA, section 3(1)).
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E. Participation quota, share value, unit entitlements
The unit owner's share of the common areas and base land is determined by the area of her apartment divided by the total area of all apartments. For example, a unit owner's share is eight percent if her unit area is 800 m 2 and the total area is 10,000 m 2 (TCC, section 799(4)), 17 'unless otherwise agreed upon' 18 and the agreement cannot contradict the CAA, the Regional Plan Act (區域計畫法), the Urban Planning Act (都 市計畫法) and other building regulations (CAA, section 9(3)). In the simplest case, if all apartments in a low-rise are of equal size, a unit owner's share is the inverse of the unit number (say, one twelfth). The default quorum rule applies to both the number of unit owners and the percentages of shares (see Part IV(E) below).
The responsibility for maintenance and reparation can be exemplified when an outside window is broken not through the fault of residents, but by natural forces such as strong winds. The unit owner can (but is not obliged to, unless otherwise mandated by the condominium bylaws) fix the window in his or her apartment at his or her own expense (CAA, section 10(1)). If the window is installed in the common areas, the responsibility for reparation falls on the board of the community association (also referred to as condominium board in this article), which either uses the common fund 19 (公共基金) or levies assessments from all or certain unit owners pro rata to defray the expenses, 20 unless otherwise required by the condominium bylaws or condominium association. 21 More specifically, the expenses of repairing and maintaining the common areas are shared in different ways, based on whether it is the 'common areas owned by all unit owners' (大公) or 'common areas owned by some unit owners' (小公). 22 The expenses for fixing the former (such as an elevator), if not paid from the common fund, are shared by unit owners pro rata (CAA, sections 10(2) and 11(2)). Those for fixing the latter (such as the common floor/ceiling between a second-floor inhabitant and a third-floor inhabitant) are shared by only those two unit owners (CAA, section 12).
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F. Termination of the condominium regime
The law does not explicitly allow the condominium form to be terminated as long as the building exists (although theoretically all unit owners may do so by consensus).
Reconstruction of the building would temporarily terminate the condominium form, 19 The source of the common fund is stipulated in the CAA, s 18(1): 'Each condominium shall establish a common fund from the following sources: 1. The builder of the condominium is required to provide a certain percentage of the cost of the project or a certain amount to pay for the management and maintenance during the year after the usage license is obtained; 2. Each unit owner pays an amount as decided by the community association; 3. The interest accrued on the fund; 4. Other incomes.' Enforcement Rules for the CAA, s 5 provides concrete percentage numbers (0.3%, 0.5%, 1.5%, or 2%) that the builder shall use to compute its assessments due to the common fund. 20 Repairing certain facilities in the common area may be subsidised by the government: CAA, s 10(3). 21 An inhabitant breaking a window in the common area still has to pay: CAA, s 10(3). 22 The legal distinction between 'common areas owned by all unit owners' and 'common areas owned by some unit owners' is based on the Regulations of the Land Registration, s 81(1 as unit owners would be co-tenants of the base land upon destruction of the building.
Reconstruction requires consensus of all unit owners, unless the re-development is conducted in line with an urban renewal project (regulated by the Urban Renewal Act 都市更新條例). In addition, if the building is seriously damaged and may endanger public safety, a reconstruction plan can be approved by the community association with ordinary voting procedure (see Part IV(E) below). Dissenting unit owners can be forced to sell their apartments (CAA, sections 13 and 14). Nonetheless, the CAA fails to specify to whom and for how much dissenters have to sell their units, and how to proceed if no one makes an offer to buy the dissenter's apartment.
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G. Dispute resolution
The competent authority can impose a civil fine (罰鍰) on the convener of the community association, an inhabitant, the officer, the chairperson of the board, the 
III. Transfer of Apartments
A. Purchasing an apartment off building plans
Consumers purchasing an apartment off building plans are protected in multiple ways.
Real estate developers are allowed to sell apartments upon acquiring building permits (CAA, section 58); 28 that is, before the building is completed and a condominium plan of subdivision is registered. The extreme informational asymmetry in the sale of 'pre-sale apartments' has led to many disputes between consumers and developers.
The Fair Trade Commission (公平交易委員會), in charge of the Fair Trade Act (公平 交易法), has promulgated a guideline on the sale of pre-sale apartments, 29 advising 26 The Civil Procedure Code, s 403(1) stipulates that the following disputes are subject to mandatory mediation: '3. Disputes among co-owners of real property arising from the management, disposition, or partition of a real property held in undivided condition; 4. Disputes arising from the management of a building or of a common part thereof among the owners of the dividedly-shared title or persons using the building'. 27 The CAA, s 59-1 also authorises the Ministry of the Interior to form a condominium dispute mediation committee (公寓大廈爭議事件調處委員會 , under which consumers can demand a pre-specified developer who has joined the guarantee network organised by the association. In short, consumers should be able to get their money back or receive a completed apartment as promised.
Another important issue in 'pre-sale apartment' transactions is the exact area sold.
Unit area is a major determinant of transaction prices, yet developers are not always able to construct the building exactly according to the blueprint. The current 'mandatory rules to be used in standard-form pre-sale apartment contract' stipulate that developers have to return the price pro rata if the actual area is smaller than the area specified in the sale contract and consumers have to compensate developers if, say, the completed building is larger than what was pre-specified. Consumers, however, are not obliged to compensate more than two percent of the contractual price, whereas developers' obligation to refund is unlimited. Before 2009, 'mandatory rules to be used in standard-form pre-sale apartment contract' allowed a one percent margin of error for both sides. The rule has since been changed to the one described above, partly because it is widely believed that developers have calculatingly reduced the size of buildings-but not by more than one percent-to save costs.
B. Restrictions on sale and letting of apartments
Restrictions on the sale and letting of apartments imposed by covenants between private parties would not be enforced for two reasons. First, covenants running with land are not a generally recognised property form, so they only have in personam effect. Second, such covenants might be considered by courts as violating public morals or social policies, and are thus invalid.
In terms of public law, there are very few statutory restrictions on discrimination in the sale or lease of apartments. So far, there is neither a general civil right law that bans discrimination between private parties, nor a comprehensive anti-discrimination stipulation regarding real estate sales or leases. One reason might be that there is no large-scale discrimination in action that warrants legislative intervention. Taiwan does not have racial issues and no hostility among ethnic groups has resulted in salient voluntary segregation, exclusionary zoning or 'exclusionary amenity'. 30 In other words, there is no ethnic discrimination in the apartment sale or lease market.
Nonetheless, other forms of discrimination, such as age (against elderly citizens) and 
IV. Managing Common-interest Communities
A. Sanctions to enforce financial and social obligations
A man's home may be his castle, but when that castle is shared, other issues such as financial and social obligations arise. 35 An inhabitant has to pay assessments to the common fund (CAA, section 18(1)) usually every month and share the reparation and maintenance expenses pro rata (see Part II(E) above). If inhabitants have missed paying their monthly assessments twice and refuse to comply after a notice to pay within a specified period is given, the officer or board may sue the inhabitants in court for the assessments plus the overdue interest (CAA, section 21).
Certain conduct is prohibited by the CAA or condominium bylaws. For instance, the following alterations are subject to the condominium bylaws and community association resolutions 'that have been reported to the local competent authority': 36 changing structures or colours and installing advertising signs or metal gratings on the exterior wall of the building, on the rooftop terrace, 37 or in air raid shelters (CAA, 38 The board can stop the act of the violator and request the violator to restore: CAA, s 8(3).
(CAA, section 16(2)). 39 The board can evict uncooperative inhabitants that violate certain rules. The common preconditions for eviction are (1) inhabitants 'fail to make the improvement within 3 months after the officer or board urges for improvement'; (2) community association makes a resolution of eviction. One of the following conditions also has to be met: first, owed expenses reach one hundredth of the total value of the apartment; second, inhabitants make no improvement or continue to violate rules after civil fines have been imposed according to section 49(1) of the CAA; 40 third, inhabitants have violated the condominium bylaws or laws to a serious extent (CAA, section 22(1)). In practice, boards have successfully evicted inhabitants who failed to pay their monthly assessments, 41 inhabitants who were mentally ill and threw knives from their windows 42 and inhabitants who swore at and hit other inhabitants.
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If the uncooperative inhabitant is a unit owner, the officer (or board) may petition the court for an injunction to force the unit owner to sell his or her unit ownership, again on the condition that the community association makes such a resolution. If the inhabitant fails to complete the transaction and finalise the ownership transfer registration within three months after the final court decision, the officer (or board) may petition the court to put the unit ownership up for auction (CAA, section 22(2)).
The author's comprehensive survey of the case law reveals that the officer (or board)
in most lawsuits only requested evictions, not forced sales. A few cases were found in which the officer (or board) requested forced sales and the court agreed, because the unit owners owed their monthly assessments 44 or changed the structure of the building-endangering public safety. 47 The CAA, s 7 forbids certain common areas to be used as part of an individual unit. 48 Pursuant to the CAA, s 23(2), these joint decisions are: '1. The range and the users of individual units and designated common areas; 2. The rights of each unit owner to use and to benefit from the common areas and the base, and the special agreements of unit owners on the use of the common areas; 3. Special agreements on prohibition of pet keeping by the inhabitants; 4. Measures for handling of obligation violations; 5. Regulations on supervision of financial management; 6. Special agreements on the required numbers and unit ownership proportions of the attending and approving unit owners to hold the community association and to approve the decisions; 7. The procedure for dispute mediation.' 49 These joint decisions are important ones that warrant more careful deliberation. Given that condominium bylaws may enact different quorum rules for revising condominium bylaws and for making less important resolutions, the mandatory rule to utilise condominium bylaws to make certain condominium bylaws are valid upon reporting to (CAA, section 8(1)), or even approval by (CAA, section 16(2)), the local competent authorities. 50 Finally, there are stipulations that can be either a default rule or a mandatory rule, leaving the court more room for interpretation. Note also that a mandatory rule can be interpreted as setting a ceiling, a floor, or both, and it is not always clear from the statutes which type of mandatory rule is prescribed.
Drafting bylaws
A condominium bylaw comes into being in several stages. A builder (起造人), who may or may not be the developer/constructor, should file a draft condominium bylaws when applying for the building permit (CAA, section 56(1)). The draft condominium bylaw is presumed to be the bylaw of the high-or low-rise before the official condominium bylaws are adopted (CAA, section 56(2)). It is advised that the draft condominium bylaw take reference from the model condominium bylaw stipulated by the Ministry of the Interior (CAA, section 60). 51 When half of the units and half of the shares are already sold, the builder is obliged to convene the first general assembly of the community association within three months (CAA, section 28). The CAA, however, only mandates the first general assembly to form a board, but does not prescribe that an official condominium bylaws has to be passed. The condominium bylaws shall then be passed according to the quorum rule prescribed by the draft condominium bylaws. Revision of the official condominium bylaws shall be done pursuant to the ' 2 /3 + 3 /4' quorum rule specified in section 31 of the CAA (more on this in Part IV(E) below), unless otherwise stipulated in the official condominium bylaws.
It is not uncommon for common-interest communities to add substantive contents into the condominium bylaws.
Legal effects of bylaws and other covenants
Condominium bylaws are similar to co-ownership covenants (共有物分管契約), but important decisions ensures that they are made with sufficiently wide support from unit owners. The latter stipulation (the conditional in rem effect) should be interpreted along with section 24 of the CAA, which mandates the grantees to (1) ask the officer or board for access to the documents specified in section 35 of the CAA before the granting; and (2) abide by all the obligations of the original unit owner defined in the Act or the condominium bylaws. The documents specified in section 35 include the condominium bylaws; the spreadsheet of the common fund; the accounting vouchers; the account books; the financial reports; the outstanding payments to common fund, 52 The shared expenses and other payable expenses of the inhabitants; the board meeting minutes; and the community association assembly minutes. Taken together, grantees are bound by other covenants among unit owners when the covenants are chronicled in either the board meeting minutes or the assembly minutes and are on file with the officer or the board, whether grantees have asked for them or not, because grantees should have had access to them and would have known. By contrast, grantees are not bound if they ask the board for the documents but the covenants in question cannot be found in the provided documents and it is unreasonable for grantees to find the loopholes themselves. In addition, covenants made by a limited number of unit owners will probably not be included in the meeting minutes. If a grantor failed to inform his or her grantee, in general (but still depending on context) it is difficult for grantees to ascertain the existence of such covenants.
The courts in Taiwan have held in several cases that grantees who know, or should have known, will be bound by the covenants. In one case, a covenant between the developer and all the purchasers of pre-sale apartments stipulated that the balconies of certain apartments should be used for growing plants to 'green' the community. The court held that this covenant should bind purchasers who bought the apartments several years later, because the obligation imposed by the covenant was obvious to anyone. 57 In another case involving pre-sale apartments, the covenant between the developer and all the purchasers prescribed that the basement counts as an individual unit and belongs to the developer, who then voluntarily provided the basement as a common area for installing water and electrical facilities. The court ruled that the party who purchased the basement later from the developer should be bound by the covenant, as the facilities were easy to find. 58 In a case with a similar arrangement of the basement, the court ruled that the owners who acquired the basement in court auctions should still be bound. 59 In 
Problems and reform proposal
The informational burden on purchasers might be too heavy. 62 Mandatory disclosure of information has been seriously challenged. 63 Scholars have argued that complicated information does not empower consumers to make better decisions, and may even be misleading. 64 The CAA, however, appears to be even worse-it mandates that information be acquired, but does not request disclosure. A purchaser has to have the legal knowledge to request access to all the separate documents. (The author, for one, has to admit an utter failure to make such a request due to ignorance when hunting for an apartment.) A purchaser has to have the luck, time or personal connection to locate the board. After all these efforts, a purchaser has to be equipped with legal, accounting, financial, if not also other, knowledge to get a sense of the implications of the documents. As none among the seller, real estate agent and chairperson of the condominium board can be relied on to provide a faithful summary of the documents, most purchasers are likely to have a nonchalant attitude. The unlucky ones among them will later find themselves bound by an unfavourable covenant (such as 'no cats allowed').
How to better structure the notice to potential purchasers is an important and interesting issue. Due to limited space, only a preliminary proposal can be laid out here. The basic idea is that information costs for third parties who are bound by in rem duties should be low. Mandatory registration is one way to lower information costs. option. If condominium affairs can be stipulated through other property instruments that are already required to be registered, the reform may be more politically feasible.
The question, then, is why the CAA creates another legal instrument called the condominium bylaws rather than using the existing property forms to achieve the policy goals. The short answer is that property forms recognised by the TCC are insufficient to coordinate lives in a common-interest community.
To be more concrete, condominium bylaws expand the scope for unit owners to make agreements that have third-party effects. Some condominium affairs, such as the quorum rule for the community association (discussed in Part IV(E) below), can hardly be considered as easements, real covenants, or co-ownership covenants, and are better described as in rem agreements necessary and unique to common-interest communities. Hence, a special instrument like condominium bylaws is needed to facilitate effective management.
That being said, if what is stipulated in condominium bylaws can be broken down into several components, and some of them under current Taiwan law can be registered, why should condominium bylaws be banned (by the Ministry of the Interior) from being registered? Granted, condominium bylaws might change relatively frequently, so it could be costly to mandate their registration. In the digital age, online registration and maintenance of condominium bylaws would most likely be low-cost. Unlike registering limited property interests, where the registrar has to substantively review the contents of the property contracts, condominium bylaws can give notice just by requiring the board of each common-interest community to upload the latest condominium bylaws to a centralised website, indexed by address. Any person can then simply go to the website and check the latest condominium bylaws.
The in rem effect of them could be designed to depend on their uploading-this is more like recording than registration.
One might contend that it is less costly to require the condominium seller to disclose the bylaws to the buyers. The author respectfully disagrees. Like in other property transaction issues, sellers do not always have incentive to disclose the bylaws to the buyers, particularly when the bylaws reduce the value of the condominium to the buyers (such as a no-dog policy to a dog lover). Even when the sellers are perfectly honest, they may not be aware of the contents of the latest bylaws.
Hence, a centralised deposit for condominium bylaws should be overall less costly.
Alternatively, the 'official copies of real estate registration information' (土地、 建物謄本) for all apartments can contain a sentence such as 'purchasers are advised to consult the condominium bylaws to understand the full duties that run with this real estate', so that purchasers without much legal knowledge will be prompted to check the condominium bylaws. Another institutional design is to require real estate developers to register what is now generally included in the condominium bylaws as easements and co-ownership covenants to the extent possible, and leave other unregistrable contents in (draft) condominium bylaws. 68 To conduct a more sophisticated cost-benefit analysis of the several proposals here, more data is needed.
The lack of data prevents the author from conducting further exploration.
Also ill-advised is the stipulation by section 799-1(4) of the TCC that other covenants among unit owners bind purchasers who know or should have known the resolutions. In terms of legal policy, bilateral or multilateral covenants between some
but not all unit owners should bind third parties only if they are registered as easements, co-ownership covenants or real covenants. 69 At the very least, the 'should have known' requirement in section 799-1(4) of the TCC should be narrowly construed so as not to impose too much informational burden on purchasers. Moreover, ordinary resolutions by community association should not receive such a favourable treatment.
The community association should be induced to either incorporate the resolution into condominium bylaws or register the agreement as a property interest. Otherwise, the ordinary resolution should bind only the current inhabitants-at most also the knowing purchasers.
C. Juridical personality of management associations
The doctrinal uncertainty
Under current law and the court jurisprudence, a community association 70 , consisting of all the owners, does not have juridical personality. A condominium board (管理委 68 One important implication for this legal design is that only consensus among apartment owners can change the existing easements and co-ownership covenants in the common-interest communities. As compared to the (super-) majority rule used for condominium bylaws, the former's rigidity could be a pro or a con, depending on the context. Real estate developers can consider registering certain agreements that are better to remain unchanged as easements and co-ownership covenants, whereas leaving matters that need flexibility in condominium bylaws. The design adopted in the US that distinguish master deed from condominium bylaws makes sense. 69 The legislature has the power to make real covenants one of the recognised property forms. 70 The CAA unfortunately uses a wrong term again here, using 'general assembly' (區分所有權人大 會) to refer to 'community association', which confused many jurists. The association is the organ of all apartment owners and they make resolutions in the general assembly to govern the common-interest community. In using 'general assembly' without ever mentioning the condominium association, the CAA sends a misleading message that a mere assembly cannot be a juridical person.
員會), 'board' for short, 'an organization composed of a number of inhabitants elected by unit owners to execute the decisions made in the community association and to manage and maintain the condominium' (CAA, section 3), does not necessarily have juridical personality. To be more specific, in theory, although a board could be incorporated as a legal person according to the TCC or the Civil Associations Act (人 民團體法), the statutory requirement for incorporation presents huge hurdles. 71 Thus, in practice, the boards are not incorporated as juridical persons and are considered by courts and scholars as 'a group without juridical personality' (非法人團體). 72 Nonetheless, pursuant to section 38 of the CAA, the board can be plaintiffs and defendants in litigation in its own name.
Given that the board is not a legal person and thus cannot own properties on its own, who owns the common fund becomes a thorny problem. Sections 18(3) and 19 of the CAA 73 hint that all inhabitants co-own the common fund, and the common fund is a separate patrimony, 74 managed by the board. 75 Not all agree with this interpretation; some claim that the common fund is a quasi-partnership, separate patrimony, held by all unit owners in 'tenancy in partnership'. 76 Both are pragmatic solutions, but neither approach fits easily into the legal system in Taiwan. This issue is dealt with in full in the next sub-section below.
Theoretically preposterous but pragmatic, courts have long held that the management body can be a contracting party, 77 even a tortfeasor, 78 despite the lack of legal personality. Under current law, no doctrinal interpretation can make sense of it. In the next sub-section, some reform proposals are advanced.
Reform proposals
A scholar has contended that Taiwan should take reference from the German law
Whonungseigentumsgesetz and give the community association the capability of enjoying rights and assuming duties (享受權利並負擔義務，即有實體法上權利能 力). Under this proposal, the community association, albeit not a legal person, can own the common fund, serve as a party in contracts and lawsuits and be a tortfeasor.
The policymakers can consider three alternatives to reform the CAA: the agency approach, the juridical person approach and the trust approach. Under the agency approach, the CAA should clarify that the common fund is indeed a separate Under the juridical person approach, the community association is recognised as a juridical person, even a non-profit corporation (which is currently not recognised in Taiwan) . This is one-step further than the scholarly proposal outlined above. Other arrangements follow logically from the legal-person construction. The community association owns the common fund and manages the associational affairs, including contracting and litigating. A community association should be a 'super-strong-form legal entity'; 81 that is, associational creditors have an exclusive claim to the common fund and unit owners' personal creditors cannot use the common fund at all to satisfy their claims. The board is, again, the agent for this association. The second approach, thus, is built on the agency approach. Under the more controversial trust approach, the common fund is considered trust property, again a separate patrimony, owned by the trustee, the board. All the unit owners are both the settlor and beneficiary of the trust. The condominium bylaw is the trust instrument that stipulates the duty and power of the trustee. The downside of this approach is that this condominium trust is idiosyncratic, as the settlors/beneficiary are obliged to 'donate' to the trust regularly, and the trust instrument-the condominium bylaws-can be revised by a (super-) majority of the settlors multiple times. Also, for the condominium board to serve as a trustee, it should have juridical personality. The third approach, thus, is built on the juridical person approach, rather than on the agency approach, and the fiduciary relation in trust law replaces that in agency relation. The fiduciary duty that accompanies trustees may become a hurdle too, as board members usually are volunteers and impositions of fiduciary duties may drive away volunteers.
Scholars immersed in English trust law might suggest the 'purpose trust', which lacks specific beneficiaries, as a solution to the problem of constant changing of beneficiary/residents. Although Taiwanese trust law allows charity trust (including community trust), it would be a doctrinal stretch to interpret that charity trust includes a trust for the benefits of specific common-interest communities. In addition, the strict regulations of ordinary charity trust may become a straightjacket for most common-interest communities.
D. Daily management of condominium
Daily management is entrusted by the community association to a board or an officer (the latter being an exception in practice). If a board is formed, the board members shall elect a chairperson. The power delegated to the chairperson and members of the board as well as other procedural (including election) rules shall be specified by the condominium bylaws or resolutions of the community association (CAA, section 19 (1) and (2)).
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Recognising that the officer or the board is unlikely to run the daily errands by itself, the CAA devotes a whole chapter to management service providers (管理服務 82 More detailed stipulations can be found in the CAA, s 29(3), (4) and (6) 人). A common-interest community can either outsource the daily management duty to a property management firm (公寓大廈管理維護公司), which has to acquire a special licence from the central competent authority or employ management staff (CAA, sections 41-46).
E. Procedures at general assembly
The community association shall convene its general assembly according to the following procedures. The assembly must be held at least once a year (CAA, section 25(1)), initiated by the chairperson of the board (CAA, section 3), who issues a written ten-day notice (that carries the agenda) to each unit owner (CAA, section 30 (1)). An ad hoc assembly may convene if an announcement is posted at least two days in advance (CAA, section 30(1)) and one of the following conditions applies:
(1) 'When critical incidents that require timely handling have taken place and the officer or board has made the request to convene the assembly'; (2) 'over one fifth of the unit owners who own more than one fifth of the shares request to convene the community association' (CAA, section 25(2)).
The CAA designs a default quorum rule for both the ordinary and exceptional procedures for convening the community association and voting. All resolutions an assembly may delegate in writing to his or her spouse, 'a direct-blood relative with capacity for civil conduct' (有行為能力之直系血親), another unit owner or a tenant of an unit to attend (CAA, section 27(2)). No unit owner may control more than one fifth of the total possible votes, either through representing his or her own multiple units or as a proxy voter for others (CAA, section 27(2) and (3)). The aforementioned default rule can be changed by condominium bylaws. Two concrete alternatives are provided by the model condominium bylaws.
As for minority protection, the opposing unit owners may file a claim with the court to revoke the condominium bylaws within three months of its revision or establishment (TCC, section 799-1(3)). A few district courts have applied section 799-1(3) of the TCC to revoke revisions to condominium bylaws because the community association had singled out one or a minority of unit owners and increased their parking fee or monthly assessments, which was found to be unfair, unreasonable or discriminatory. 85 A gap in the law is whether the court may revoke resolutions (其 他決議) by community associations that do not amend the condominium bylaws. The author found a case in which both the district court and the appellate court applied In this case, the community association singles out the plaintiff and unreasonably increases its monthly assessments.
F. Management in a multi-building scheme
A multiple-building scheme was almost entirely absent in the CAA. In defining 'unit ownership' in section 3, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2 as '[a] number of people [who] divide one building and each owns an individual unit of the building and also holds a share of the common areas' (emphasis added), 87 the legislature showed that its main interest is in solving the problem in stand-alone high-or low-rises, not in say, a gated community that contains more than one building. The sole exception is section 26(1) of the CAA, which stipulates that if several apartment buildings form a complex that mixes residential and commercial uses, the commercial unit in one building or all commercial units in all apartment buildings in the complex may form its own board. 
G. Keeping of pets, conduct of a profession, making music
Neither the CAA nor the TCC regulate the level of commercial activities (for example, operating hours of a medical practice) and other conduct like the making of music in an 87 The official translation uses 'a building' instead of 'one building', but the author believes that the former fails to express the nuance. Articles such as 'a', 'an', and 'the' are unnecessary, if not utterly non-existent, in Chinese, so is the plural form. Inhabitants can keep pets as long as they do not 'hinder public sanitation, peace or safety' and the condominium bylaws 92 and other laws do not prohibit keeping (certain) pets (CAA, section 16(4)).
V. Recent Developments
Other than adding or revising a few articles in the TCC that relate to condominium laws in 2009, condominium law itself has not been extensively amended since 2003.
One recent development in condominium law will have profound impacts on unit owners, whereas a high-profile yet failed attempt to revamp the condominium law The first regards the definition of unit or the scope of the apartment that owners buy. In real estate transaction in Taiwan, a seller quotes a total price and a buyer compares the quoted prices by calculating the price per ping (坪; =3.3057 m 2 ).
Price per ping * total area = total price
The total area in practice refers to (1) the apartment area + (2) the area of the peripheral building 94 (附屬建物) + (3) the area of the individual share of the common areas. allowing only balconies, but not awnings and overhangs, to be counted as part of (2).
The Premier, however, later overruled this amendment after protests from the association of real estate developers. efficiency-enhancing policy proposal eventually was not implemented.
The second development regards the cost of acquiring price information of real estates. Before August 2012, no agency, real estate agent, or consumer had systematic knowledge of the actual transaction prices of real estates. The local governments announce Publicly Announced Land Value (公告地價) for each land parcel every three years for property tax (土地稅) purposes, 98 and they announce Assessed Current Land Value (公告土地現值) for each land parcel every year to assess land value increment tax (土地增值稅). 99 To save the latter tax, transacting parties almost always report to the government that the transacting price of land is exactly the Assessed Current Land Value, which everyone in Taiwan knows is below fair market value. As a result, real estate (land or land plus fixtures) value is opaque, leaving a lot of room for developers to command unreasonably high prices. reported sales of land (that is, sales of buildings with or without land are not counted here). 102 Many believe that the user-friendly disclosure of sale prices stabilises the real estate markets (stopping the growth of bubbles that is). Thus, while the CAA itself has not changed in recent years, the actual price report system has a profound impact on the wealth of current and future apartment owners.
VI. Conclusion
This article reviews the statutory and court-made doctrines of condominium law in Taiwan. Basic features, major issues and recent trends are identified. Using information-cost theory, this article also examines in detail two problematic stipulations and provides reform proposals. This article argues that given the in rem effect of condominium bylaws, the current regime, under which condominium bylaws are merely available upon request and cannot be registered, imposes high information costs on potential transacting parties. It advocates two alternatives: first, condominium bylaws should be uploaded to a centralised deposit, available for any interested party; second, the official copies of real estate registration information should add a warning that certain restrictions on real estate are only available in condominium bylaws. In addition, this article contends that a condominium association's lack of juridical personality has created legal uncertainty-such as who owns the common fund. This article compares the pros and cons of three reform proposals: the agency approach, the juridical person approach and the trust approach.
All things considered, the juridical person approach shall be the best one to end the long-time doctrinal mess.
